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The ability to understand and attribute mental states to oneself and others is referred 
as Theory of Mind (ToM; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). ToM is essential for comprehension 
of our own behaviour as well as that of others. These self- and other-orientated attributions 
have been shown to be dissociable through clinical, experimental and neuroimaging studies 
(e.g., Bradford, Jentzsch, & Gomez, 2015, Bodden et al., 2010; Decety, & Sommerville, 
2003; Harari, Shamay-Tsorry, Ravid, & Levkovitz, 2010). Here we report how simply 
rewording whether a real-world problem-solving task is completed from the perspective of 
the self or others can change how the test is performed.   
 Both patients CW (61 years old) and patient FH (75 years old) were  right-handed 
male patients who suffered right hemisphere ischemic strokes and were recruited through the 
Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh within one month post-stroke.	  CW and FH were referred by 
the Acute Stroke Unit team as they met our selection criteria of no history of previous 
vascular accident,  head injury, psychiatric or other neuropsychological disorders such as 
amnesia, apraxia, dysphasia or neglect and had normal or  corrected to normal vision and 
hearing. This was determined through a background neuropsychological assessment by a 
stroke specialist.   
 CW and FH performed the Key Search task from the Behavioural Assessment of the 
Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS; Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie, & Evans, 1996) which 
assesses planning and strategy formation both from a first- and third-person perspective. The 
patients were presented with an A4-sized piece of paper with a 100mm square in the middle 
and a black dot 50 mm below it representing the field.  
 Firstly, the Key Search task was administered and scored according to the BADS 
manual, with the following instructions (Wilson et al., 1996, p 9): 
‘I want you to imagine that this square is a large field. Somewhere in this field you 
have lost your keys. You don’t know exactly where you have lost them because you have 
	  	  
been all over the field, all you know is that they are somewhere in the field. Starting from this 
dot I want you to draw a line with the pen to show me where you would walk to search the 
field to make absolutely certain that you would find your keys no matter where they were.’  
During standard administration of the test, it became clear that patient CW could not 
grasp the concept of ‘not knowing’ where he had lost his own keys. He insisted that he would 
know where he had lost them as he would know exactly where he had walked. This led the 
researcher to change the instructions and deliver the Key Search test once again but from a 
third person perspective: 
‘I want you to imagine that this square is a large field. Somewhere in this field John 
has lost his keys. You don’t know exactly where he has lost them because he has been all 
over the field, all you know is that they are somewhere in the field. Starting from this dot I 
want you to draw a line with the pen to show me where you would walk to search the field to 
make absolutely certain that you would find John’s keys no matter where they were’.  
After changing the instructions from the first- to the third-person, patient CW’s score 
on the Key Search task improved considerably (see Figure 1). The opposite pattern was found 
for patient FH who performed better on the task when it was administered in the first-person 
rather than the third-person perspective, although the effect of perspective was not as 
substantial (see Figure 2).  
	  
- Insert Figures 1 and 2 around here - 
 
Here we report an interesting phenomena where the perspective taken affects the way 
that participants perform the task. Patient FH searched the entire field when looking for his 
own key but searched only half the field when searching for the key on John’s behalf. In 
contrast, patient CW searched the entire field when searching for the lost key for John, but 
	  	  
made little attempt to search for his own key. Ratings of behaviour on the Frontal System 
Behavioural Scale (FrSBe; Grace & Malloy, 2001) post-stroke might shed some light on the 
underlying causes for these differences in performance depending on which perspective the 
patient is asked to take (Table 1). The FrSBe formerly known as Frontal Lobe Personality 
Scale (FLOPS: Grace, Stout, & Malloy, 1999) is designed to measure changes in apathy, 
disinhibition and executive functioning rated both by a close family member (or carer) and 
the patient. In Table 1 we report scores based on both patients and relative ratings after 
stroke. 
 
- Insert Table 1 around here - 
 
Patient CW was rated as having the strongest changes in relation to executive 
functioning (e.g., ‘patient gets stuck on certain ideas’, ‘denies having problems’ or ‘is 
unaware of problems or mistakes’). Hence,  CW’s difficulty of grasping the concept of ‘not 
knowing’ where he had lost his own key might suggest very concrete thinking, difficulty in 
abstract reasoning and is more likely to be associated with general dysexecutive syndrome. 
Indeed, he had an overall BADS profile score of 10 out of 24 indicating a clinical 
impairment. In contrast, FH performed within the average range with an overall BADS 
profile score of 17. His performance on other BADS subtests were also within the average 
range including the ZOO Map Test (with profile score 4 out of 4) where the patient has to 
plan a route around a zoo on a map and which is similar to the key search task, suggesting his 
differences in performance on the Key Search task is not due to an executive or visuospatial 
impairment. It may be that FH’s poorer performance on the 3rd person perspective version of 
the task is due to a deficit in Theory of Mind (ToM) which literally involves ‘putting oneself 
in another person shoes’ while searching for the key.  Our results support the fMRI literature 
	  	  
showing that performance on first versus third person perspective tasks depends on different 
neural processes (e.g., Vogeley, Ritzl, Falkai, Zilles & Fink, 2004).  Of course, we cannot 
completely rule out the possibility of neglect without a more extensive neuropsychological 
assessment being carried out.  
Further work might involve testing and re-testing patients on a variety of tasks from a 
1st and 3rd person perspective to determine whether this dissociation is a consistent finding 
within and between tasks. In any case, the ‘key to success’ in neuropsychological assessment 
is being aware  that there are many underlying processes that influence test performance, and 
perspective taking, as highlighted by our observation, might be an important one to consider! 
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Table 1. T-scores reflecting behavioural change on the FrSBe subscales (apathy, disinhibition 
and executive functioning) on the self and family rating after stroke. 
	  
Patient Rater  Apathy   Disinhibition   Executive 
Dysfunction  
 Total 
Score   
 
CW Self  67 C  53  91 C  78 C 
Family  59  49  79 C  67 C 
FH Self  66 C  71 C  61 B  69 C 
Family  86 C  80 C  99 C  101C 
Note: C = clinical impairment, B = borderline impairment 
  
	  	  
Figure Captions 
Figure 1.  
Top: Patient CW’s performance on the Key Search task from the perspective of the first 
person (left) scoring 4 out of 16 and third person (right) scoring 15 out of 16. 
Bottom: Patient FH’s performance on the Key Search task from the perspective of the first 
person (left) scoring 10 out of 16 and the third person (right) scoring 8 out of 16. 
	  	  
     
 
 
 
 
 
